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The Magnificent Kerry

4 February 2014

The Magnificent Kerry

By Gwynne Dyer

John Kerry has been US Secretary of State for precisely one year, and he has already 1) rescued President Obama from his ill-considered promse to bomb Syria if it crossed the “red line” and used poison gas; 2) opened serious negotiations with Iran on its alleged attempt to build nuclear weapons; and 3) taken on the job of brokering an Israeli-Palestinian peace accord.

Getting Obama off the hook was useful, and may yet lead to the US ending its support for the insurgency in Syria, which at this point would probably be the least bad outcome. Opening negotiations with Iran was long overdue, and makes the nightmare prospect of an American or a joint US-Israeli air attack on Iran daily less likely. But even King Solomon and Avicenna (Ibn Sina), sitting jointly in judgement on the Israeli-Palestinian dispute, could not broker a peace accord there.

Kerry is indefatigable. He has been to Israel/Palestine eleven times in the past year, and spent as much as a hundred hours face to face with Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu, Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas or their close advisers. Unlike all the previous “brokers”, he has been astoundingly discreet: not a hint of what has been said in private has leaked into the public domain. And yet there is almost no hope of a real peace deal.

If persistence in the face of all the odds were enough, Kerry would be the man who finally made it happen. (Israeli Defence Minister Moshe Yaalon recently complained that his approach is “obsessive and messianic.”) But Kerry has no leverage: he has to rely on the desire of the two leaders to make the “peace process” work, and it just isn’t there; not, at least, on any terms that both would find acceptable.

The list of deal-breakers includes almost every topic under discussion: the borders of a Palestinian state, the future of the Jewish settlements in the occupied territories, whether Jerusalem can be the joint capital of Israel and Palestine, whether Israel can maintain a military presence in the Jordan Valley, the right of Palestinian refugees to return to their ancestral homes, and Israel’s demand that the Palestinians recognise it as an explicitly Jewish state.

This last demand, which was only raised in the past couple of years, seems deliberately designed to be unacceptable to the Palestinians. Not only are they required to acknowledge the legitimacy of the Israeli state (which they have already done), but also to give their blessing to the ethnic and religious character of that state.

It is not normal in diplomacy for one state to comment upon the internal arrangements of another, let alone to give them its public support. Even the United States, Israel’s closest ally and supporter, does not officially recognise it as a “Jewish state.” The Israeli demand is an attempt to rub the Palestinians’ noses in their defeat, and why would you set out to do that if you really wanted a deal?

The Palestinian insistence on a “right of return,” however rooted in natural justice, is equally self-defeating in practice. Everybody knows that a peace deal must mean compensation for the refugees of 1948 and their descendants, not a general right of return to what is now Israel, for that really would mean the end of the “Jewish state.” But no Palestinian leader has ever dared to say so out loud.

So why, then, has John Kerry embarked on his quixotic mission to make the “peace process” work? It has been effectively dead for at least a dozen years, although it remains unburied because the pretense that it is still alive allows everybody to avoid hard decisions. But Kerry, with his nine-month deadline to achieve a comprehensive “final-status agreement” (which expires in April), is taking it seriously.

His own explanation is lyrical but opaque: “I believe that history is not made by cynics. It is made by realists who are not afraid to dream.” But the business about “making history” – that, perhaps, is sincere. Kerry has had a long and interesting career as a senator, and even took a shot at the presidency, but this is probably his last big job, and he wants to make his mark.

As the reality of what he is up against strikes home, he has scaled back his ambitions a good deal. For some months now he has been talking about a more modest “framework” deal by April that would establish a set of basic principles for further talks. Such deals commit nobody to anything, and are therefore a popular way of pretending to make progress, but he’ll be lucky to get even that.

The French general Pierre Bosquet, watching the suicidal charge of the British Light Brigade in the Crimean War in 1854, said: “It is magnificent, but it is not war. It’s madness.”

Kerry’s foredoomed quest for a final peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians is magnificent too, in its own peculiar way, but it’s not diplomacy. It’s hubris.

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To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 7 and 11. (“It is…deal”; and “As the…that”)

Gwynne Dyer is an independent journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries.

 

 

Mea Culpa

2 February 2014

Mea Culpa

By Gwynne Dyer

Confession is good for the soul, and my soul is certainly in need of improvement, so here is a confession. I got it wrong in my article “Geo-Engineering in Trouble”, sent out on 15 January. I couldn’t be happier about that.

The article said that a new scientific study, carried out by Angus Ferraro, Ellie Highwood and Andrew Charlton-Perez of Reading University, showed that the most widely discussed geo-engineering method for holding the global temperature down would have disastrous consequences for agriculture. The method is injecting sulphur dioxide into the stratosphere; the (unintended) result would be devastating drought in the tropics.

The idea of using sulphate aerosols in the stratosphere to reflect back some incoming sunlight, thus lowering surface temperatures on Earth, has been the leading contender for a geo-engineering solution to runaway heating since the whole subject came out of the closet eight years ago. And then along come “Ferraro et al.” (as the scientists put it) to tell us that the side-effects will be disastrous. Thanks, guys.

So I ended the article by saying: “The sulphur dioxide technique was the cheapest and seemingly the best understood option for holding the temperature down. A great many people were glad that it was there, as a kind of safety net if we really don’t get our act together in time to halt the warming by less intrusive means. Now there’s no safety net.”

Almost immediately I got an email from Andy Parker, now a research fellow in the Kennedy School at Harvard University and previously a climate change policy advisor for the Royal Society in the United Kingdom. You’ve been suckered by the publicity flacks at Reading University, he said (though in kinder words). They have spun the research findings for maximum shock value. In other words, read the damn thing before you write about it.

Well, actually, I did read it (it’s available on-line), but the conclusions are couched in the usual science-speak, with a resolute avoidance of anything that might look like interpretation for the general public. I didn’t look long enough at the key graph that undercuts the dire conclusions of the publicists, presumably because I had already been conditioned by them to see something else there.

Drastic consequences would indeed ensue if you tried to geo-engineer a 4 degrees C warmer world all the way back down to the pre-industrial average global temperature by putting sulphate aerosols in the stratosphere. But nobody in their right mind would try to do that.

On the other hand, if you were using sulphates to hold the temperature down to plus 1.8 degrees C, in a world where the carbon dioxide content of the atmosphere would otherwise give you plus 4 degrees C, then the effect on tropical rainfall would be small. And that is a far likelier scenario, because we are most unlikely to resort to large-scale geo-engineering until we are right at the threshold (around plus 2 degrees C) of runaway warming.

So the correct conclusion to draw from Ferrero et al. is that geo-engineering with sulphates is still one of the more promising techniques for holding the temperature down, and should be investigated further. As Andy Parker put it, “this does not tell us that we should do geo-engineering, but it does mean that the paper is a long way from being the nail in the coffin that the press release implies.”

And then I got another email, this time from my old friend Amory Lovins, co-founder and chief scientist at the Rocky Mountain Institute, who took me to task for assuming that human greenhouse gas emissions “probably will not drop” fast enough to prevent us from going into runaway warning (unless we geo-engineer) later this century.

Not true, he said. “Since the Kyoto conference in 1997, most efforts to hedge climate risks have made four main errors: assuming solutions will be costly rather than (at least mainly) profitable; insisting they be motivated by concerns about climate rather than about security, profit, or economic development; assuming they require a global treaty; and assuming businesses can do little or nothing before carbon is priced.”

“As these errors are gradually realized, climate protection is changing course. It will be led more by countries and companies than by international treaties and organizations, more by the private sector and civil society than by governments, more by leading developing economies than by mature developed ones, and more by efficiency and clean energy’s economic fundamentals than by possible future carbon pricing.”

He pointed out how strongly China is committed to clean energy. Last year renewables, (including hydro) accounted for 43 percent of new generating capacity in China, as the extra coal plants ordered long ago taper sharply down. India is showing signs of moving in the same direction, and there’s even hope that Japan may decide to replace all the nuclear capacity it is shutting down with renewables rather than coal.

So I shouldn’t be so pessimistic, they were both telling me. I believe Andy Parker is right, and I hope Amory Lovins is right too. But just in case Amory is a bit off in the timing of all these turn-arounds on greenhouse gas emissions in Asia, I would still like to see a lot of research, including small-scale experiments in the open atmosphere, on the various techniques for geo-engineering.

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To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 3, 11 and 12. (“The idea…guys”; and “Not…pricing”)

Gwynne Dyer is an independent journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries.

 

The Arab Spring Three Years On

27 January 2014

The Arab Spring Three Years On

By Gwynne Dyer

It has taken a little longer than it did after the 1848 revolutions in Europe, but on the third anniversary of the Egyptian revolution we can definitely say that the “Arab Spring” is finished. The popular, mostly non-violent revolutions that tried to overthrow the single-party dictatorships and absolute monarchies of the Arab world had their moments of glory, but the party is over and the bosses are back.

People in the Middle East hate having their triumphs and tragedies treated as a second-hand version of European history, but the parallels with Europe in 1848 are hard to resist. The Arab tyrants had been in power for just as long, the revolutions were fuelled by the same mixture of democratic idealism and frustrated nationalism, and once again the trigger for the revolutions (if you had to highlight just one factor) was soaring food prices.

In many places the Arab revolutionaries had startlingly quick successes at first – Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen – just like the French, German, and Italian revolutionaries did in Europe’s “Springtime of the Peoples”. For a time it looked like everything would change. Then came the counter-revolutions and it all fell apart, leaving only a few countries permanently changed for the better – like Denmark then, or Tunisia in today’s Arab world.

The disheartening parallels are particularly strong between Egypt, by far the biggest country in the Arab world, and France, which was Europe’s most important and populous country in 1848. In both cases, the revolutions at first brought free media, civil rights and free elections, but also a great deal of social turmoil and disorientation.

In both France and Egypt the newly enfranchised masses then elected presidents whose background alarmed much of the population: a nephew of Napoleon in one case, a leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in the other. And here the stories diverge for a time – but the ending, alas, does not.

In France, President Louis Napoleon launched a coup against his own presidency, and re-emerged in 1852 as Emperor Napoleon III. It had been a turbulent few years, and by then a large majority of the French were willing to vote for him because he represented authority, stability and tradition. They threw away their own democracy.

In Egypt last year, the army allied itself with former revolutionaries to overthrow the elected president, Mohamed Morsi – and within a few months, after an election which will genuinely represent the wish of most Egyptians to trade their new democracy for authority, stability and tradition, Field Marshal Abdel Fatah al-Sisi will duly assume the presidency. The counter-revolution is as popular in Egypt now as it was in France then.

And if you fear that this analogy is really relevant, then here’s the worst of it. After the defeat of the 1848 revolutions, there were no further democratic revolutions in Europe for twenty years. If that timetable were also to apply to the Arab world, then the next round of democratic revolutions would only be due around 2035. But it probably doesn’t apply.

There is one key difference between the European revolutions of 1848 and the Arab revolutions of 2011. The 1848 revolutions were violent explosions of popular anger that succeeded in hours or days, while those of 2010-11 were largely non-violent, more calculated struggles that took much longer to win. Non-violent revolutions give millions of people time to think about why they are taking these risks and what they hope to get out of it.

They may still lose focus, take wrong turns, even throw all their gains away. Mistakes are human, and so is failure. But once people have participated in a non-violent revolution they are permanently politicised, and in the long run they are quite likely to remember what they came for.

The most promising candidate to succeed Gene Sharp as the world authority on non-violent revolutions is Erica Chernoweth, a young American academic who co-wrote the study “Why Civil Resistance Works: The Strategic Logic of Non-Violent Conflict” with diplomat Maria Stephan. A lot of their book is about why non-violent revolution succeeds or fails, but most interesting of all are their statistics about HOW OFTEN it succeeds.

Their headline statistic is that violent revolutionary struggles succeed in overthrowing an oppressive regime only 30 percent of the time, whereas non-violent campaigns succeed almost 60 percent of the time. By that standard, the Arab world is certainly under-performing.

There have been only two relative successes among the Arab countries, Tunisia and Morocco (where the change came so quickly that hardly anybody noticed). There were two no-score draws: Yemen and Jordan. And there were three abject failures: Bahrain, Egypt and Syria, the latter ending up in a full-scale civil war. (Libya doesn’t count, as it was a violent revolution with large foreign participation right from the start.) So far, not so good.

But the most relevant statistic from Chernoweth and Stephan’s work for the future of the Arab world is this: “Holding all other variables constant, the average country with a failed non-violent campaign has over a 35 percent chance of becoming a democracy five years after a conflict’s end.” Failure may be only temporary. The game isn’t over yet.

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To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 2 and 13. (“People…prices”; and “There have…good”)

Gwynne Dyer is an independent journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries.

 

 

Ukraine Turns Violent

22 January 2014

Ukraine Turns Violent

By Gwynne Dyer

“The protest mood in Ukraine is at a higher temperature than ever before,” said Vitali Klitschko, the de facto leader of the anti-government protests that have filled central Kiev for the past two months, in an interview with the Guardian on Tuesday. “We only need a small spark for the situation to develop in a way that will be completely out of control for the authorities.”

It’s make-or-break time, because on Wednesday a raft of new laws came into effect that make almost everything the protesters have been doing illegal. The laws, which were rushed through the Ukrainian parliament last week on a show of hands, ban helmets, hard hats and masks at rallies, and impose fines and prison sentences for setting up unauthorised tents, stages or sound systems in public places.

They prescribe jail terms for anybody blockading public buildings, and make it a crime to “slander” public officials (whatever that means). You can also go to jail for handing out pamphlets, and you can get 15 years for being part of a “mass riot” (however the government chooses to define that).

If President Viktor Yanukovych’s government tries to enforce these laws on the tent city of protesters that has filled the “Maidan” (Independence Square) since late November, there will be something like civil war in the heart of the Ukrainian capital. He hasn’t done so yet, but mobile phone users near the violent clashes early Tuesday morning got text messages saying: “Dear subscriber, you are registered as a participant in a mass riot.”

Yanukovych is getting desperate, because the protests are no longer just against his abrupt decision not to sign a treaty creating closer trade and political ties between Ukraine and the European Union, and to turn to Russia instead for loans ($15 billion) and discounted gas.

The protests have expanded to take in the dire state of the economy, Yanukovych’s ruthless political tactics, and the sudden wealth of the “Family” of officials and businessmen who support him.

So long as the conflict was about the EU-or-Russia issue, Yanukovych could count on the backing of the Russian-speaking half of the Ukrainian population, in the south and the heavily industrialised east of the country: many people there fear for their jobs if the Ukrainian economy integrates with the EU.

But the poverty and the corruption hurt everybody, whether they speak Ukrainian or Russian. Everybody can get together and protest about that.

Another worry for Yanukovych is the attitude of the oligarchs, the billionaire businessmen like Rinat Ahmetov, Viktor Pinchuk and Igor Kolomoisky who control a large share of the Ukrainian economy. They have not been politically neutered like the oligarchs in Vladimir Putin’s Russia, and it’s striking that the televisions stations they own have been covering the demonstrations quite objectively.

The ultimate loyalty of the oligarchs is to their money, of course, but they seem to believe that in the long run their money is safer in EU countries, or at least in a Ukraine that conforms to EU legal standards. So they are not ecstatic about Yaukovych’s decision to turn away from the EU, and they are quite capable of turning away from him. Indeed, that’s exactly what they did during the Orange Revolution of 2004, and they could do it again.

So Yanukovych’s back is to the wall, and he has apparently decided that it’s worth gambling that he can clear the streets by force without triggering a confrontation that spreads far beyond the Maidan. And it will have to be done by force, because the protesters will not just fold their tents and creep off home.

The sudden lurch into violence on the streets on Sunday and Monday nights occurred in this context. The several hundred young men who attacked the riot police with pipes, chains and fire-bombs were originally thought to be “provocateurs” hired by the government to give it a justification for using violence on the mass of peaceful protesters, but lots of them were not.

The core group of fighters were members of a radical ultra-nationalist group called Right Sector that is both anti-Russian and anti-EU. It includes both Russian and Ukrainian speakers, and imagines it can use the current crisis to “destroy the skeleton state” and build a new state on the ruins. Things are indeed spinning out of control.

When Vitali Klitschko arrived on the scene to beg them to remain non-violent, he was attacked with a fire extinguisher – and thousands of ordinary protesters showed up to cheer the young thugs as they attacked the police. There is a serious potential for mass violence here, and that could lead to even worse things.

Viktor Yanukovych, for all his faults, is the legitimately elected president of Ukraine, and he has a majority in parliament. What if, facing overthrow in the streets, he called for “fraternal aid” from Russia to defend democracy in Ukraine?

What if the Russians, who are already claiming that it’s a Western plot – “We have information that much of this is being stimulated from abroad,” said Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov on Monday – agree to send him police and military help?

It sounds far-fetched and it would be extremely stupid, but everybody is busily painting themselves into corners and there is a small but real possibility that it could happen. In which case, welcome to the Second Cold War.

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To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 8, 9 and 12. (“Another…again”; and “The core…control”)

Gwynne Dyer is an independent journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries.