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Climate Change: The Impossible Deal

For “shall”, substitute “may”. For example, change “countries signing this climate change treaty SHALL state how much they are going to cut their greenhouse emissions” to “countries signing this climate change treaty MAY state how much they are going to cut their emissions if they feel like it, but if they don’t, hey, no problem.”

It’s like the old Irish joke. A lost traveller comes up to a local resident and asks how to get to Dublin. “Well, sir,” replies the local, “if that’s where you want to get to, I wouldn’t start from here.”

If you ask anybody involved in the climate change negotiations how to get to a global deal, you’ll probably get the same answer. “If that’s where you want to go, sir, you shouldn’t start from here.” But here is where we have to start from, like it or not. Which is what makes the negotiations so difficult.

The last preliminary meeting on a global treaty to stop runaway climate change has just wound up in Lima, Peru, two days late. The final two days were spent watering down various parts of the text so that no country would just walk away. That’s where SHALL was changed to MAY, not once but many times. So quite a lot of the substance has been lost even before the final negotiations begin in Paris next December.

It was bound to happen. That’s what diplomacy is for: devising some way of making the problem a little less bad even when a comprehensive deal that really solves the problem is impossible. But why is the comprehensive deal impossible? Because of the history.

There is a fair deal that well-informed people in every country would accept, and everybody involved in the climate negotiations knows what it is. Most parts of this deal were on the table at the last big climate summit in Copenhagen in 2009, but its political implications were so big that many governments simply ran away. The deal collapsed, and we lost five years.

Here’s the only deal that would be fair to everybody. The “old rich” countries – those that became industrialised countries a hundred years ago or more – would make big cuts in their greenhouse gas emissions starting now: say, 40 percent cuts in the next ten years, or 4 percent a year.

That’s a lot, but it is achievable, because the demand for energy in most rich countries is already in decline, and much of the energy that they do produce is wasted. Getting the first forty percent is not all that hard, and cuts of that scale up front would give us much more time to work on the remaining emissions.

This is not the part of the deal that drives the governments of the developed countries into headlong flight. It’s the other part, in which the developing countries (the other six-sevenths of the world’s population) only have to cap their emissions for the next decade, not actually cut them.

You can legitimately ask the developing countries to cap their emissions, but you can’t insist that they stay poor. Even the biggest developing countries like China, India, Brazil and Indonesia are still comparatively poor, and to give their people a developed-world living standard they will have to go on increasing their energy production for decades.

If they can’t do that by building more fossil-fuel plants (because they have capped their emissions), then they will have to do it by building more “clean” energy sources: wind, solar, nuclear, anything except coal, oil or gas.

Those “clean” energy sources are generally more expensive than the fossil fuels they used to depend on, so who covers the extra expense? Answer: the developed countries.

This is the deal killer. You cannot get the developing countries to cap their greenhouse gas emissions unless they get subsidies from the rich countries to help them build “clean” energy sources instead. And the developed countries regard this demand for subsidies ($100 billion a year was the figure on the table at Copenhagen five years ago) as outrageous.

It is not really outrageous at all. In view of the history of greenhouse gas emissions, it is quite fair. But almost nobody in the developed countries knows that history.

It’s quite simple. The developed countries are rich because they started burning fossil fuels between one and two hundred years ago and industrialised early. The developing countries only started burning fossil fuels in a big way thirty or forty years ago, and are still climbing out of poverty. SO 80 PERCENT OF THE GREENHOUSE GASES OF HUMAN ORIGIN IN THE ATMOSPHERE WERE PUT THERE BY THE RICH COUNTRIES.

The rich countries caused this climate crisis; the developing countries only inherited it. So the responsibility for dealing with it – and paying for it – rests mostly with those who caused it.

Until public opinion in the developed world understands that this deal is fair, no government in the rich world will dare to sign up for it. It would be political suicide. And until that deal is signed, no major developing country will agree to cap its emissions.

In the developing world, everybody who counts politically understands the history of greenhouse gas emissions very well. One does sometimes wonder if the rich world’s apparent ignorance of this history is a little bit self-serving.
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To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 2, 3 and 6. (“It’s…difficult”; and “There is…years”)

Cluster-Bomb Ban

30 May 2008

Cluster-Bomb Ban

By Gwynne Dyer

The British armed forces clung to their cluster bombs like a baby to its rattle, and some suspected that they were trying to sabotage the treaty on behalf of their American friends (who were not there, of course). But Prime Minister Gordon Brown overruled them, in the end, and Britain was among the hundred countries that agreed to a treaty banning cluster bombs in Dublin on Friday.

Well, it doesn’t actually ban all cluster bombs; just the current designs that leave large areas littered with unexploded bomblets that go on killing civilians for years after they were dropped. Israel dropped some four million bomblets on Lebanon during the last three days of the 2006 war, for example, and more than thirty people have been killed by them since the war ended.

If someone designed a cluster bomb whose bomblets all exploded reliably on impact, or at least within 48 hours of landing, then it would presumably be legal since it mostly killed soldiers. The major producers of cluster bombs — the US, Russia, Israel, China, India and Pakistan — were not even at the Dublin conference, and have no intention of signing the treaty. But it’s a start.

This sort of treaty does not really work by legal compulsion. The countries that sign the treaty are legally bound by it, but even for them there is no enforcement mechanism. For those that don’t sign the treaty, there are no formal constraints of any sort. But by “banning” a particular weapon, the smaller and less militarised countries can exert a real moral pressure on those nations that insist on retaining it.

It wouldn’t work if one of those countries felt that its very survival was threatened, but that hardly ever happens. In lesser emergencies, when a country is choosing which weapons to use from a broad range of options in its arsenal, the fact that cluster bombs are now seen as illegal by a majority of the world’s states could have a major influence on which weapons get chosen.

They won’t admit it, of course. The Pentagon issued a statement saying that “While the United States shares the humanitarian concerns of those in Dublin, cluster munitions have demonstrated military utility, and their elimination from US stockpiles would put the lives of our soldiers…at risk.” But this statement would be even truer of nuclear weapons, which have excellent military utility against troops but also kill everybody else in the vicinity.

Cluster bombs would have been quite useful in the environment they were originally designed for, which was industrial-scale warfare in central Europe or on the Korean peninsula. If they exploded high enough to let the bomblets scatter properly, a few well-placed cluster bombs or shells could destroy dozens of soft-skinned military vehicles and blunt the attack of an entire mechanised infantry battalion. A few hundred could stop an army corps.

But that kind of war never happened, and where cluster bombs have actually been used is in little wars against low-tech opponents: by the US in Cambodia, by Russia in Afghanistan, by the US again in Kosovo and Iraq, and by Israel in Lebanon. They are not particularly effective against the sort of targets that are on offer in that kind of war, but what the hell, we have them, let’s use them.

Unfortunately, whether by accident or by design, the bomblets have this curious propensity not to go off right away. Between 10 percent and 40 percent of the hundreds of bomblets released by the average cluster bomb or shell fail to detonate on hitting the ground, and lie there until — weeks or months or years later — a farmer drives over it in his tractor, or a kid comes along and picks it up. It is estimated that 40 percent of the casualties of cluster bombs are not soldiers but children.

So why do some countries cling to these things, while others are willing to let them go? If you look at the list of the hold-outs, it is mainly the countries that just might, in some remote but dreadful contingency, have to face a mass assault by motorised forces: US forces in Korea, Indian or Pakistani forces in the Punjab, the Israelis against Syria (although the Syrians would have to rebuild their forces first), and Russia and China mainly against each other.

None of these contingencies is at all likely to occur, but the rule in military affairs (as in much else) is better safe than sorry. None of these countries signed the 1997 treaty banning anti-personnel land-mines either, and they are not going to give up their cluster bombs. So of what use is the treaty?

More than you might think. Cluster bombs are now stigmatised as immoral and (for most countries) illegal weapons, and governments that do use them will have to pay a high public relations price. That certainly wouldn’t deter those countries if they would make a real difference militarily, but that has not been the case in most instances where they have been used in the past.

What the treaty really does is to shift assumptions so that international public opinion will see a country that uses cluster bombs as being in the wrong. As a result, there will be instances where a country that possesses them decides not to use them. The treaty is not a waste of time.

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To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 5 and 6. (“It wouldn’t…the vicinity”)