// archives

Mohamed Morsi

This tag is associated with 2 posts

Morsi: A Death Foretold

Egypt’s first and last democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, died on Monday, lying on the floor of the courtroom where they were trying him on yet more charges. (He was already serving several life sentences.) It was probably a heart attack, but according to witnesses they left him lying there for twenty minutes before medical help arrived.

He was only 67, but he was not in good health: he had both diabetes and liver disease. But he was not getting proper treatment for those illnesses: a British parliamentary group that investigated his situation at his family’s request last year concluded that without urgent medical assistance the damage to his health could be “permanent and possibly terminal.” Well, it was.

Morsi was held in solitary confinement for six years, and saw his family just three times. His living conditions were such that the United Nations Human rights office has called for a “prompt, impartial, thorough and transparent investigation” into his death. Fair enough, but he is only one of thousands of Egyptians who have been murdered or tortured by the military regime that overthrew him in 2013.

Morsi was not a very good president: he was a narrow, stubborn man who governed solely in the interests of his own Muslim Brotherhood party and its Islamic priorities. He behaved like this even though he had barely scraped into the presidency with the votes of many who, though secular in their views and values, feared that otherwise the candidate of the old regime would win.

They fully shared his desire to uproot the secular ‘deep state’ that had ruled Egypt through three military dictators and six decades, but they had not signed up for an Islamist constitution instead. So they started demonstrating against Morsi, and only a year after he was elected they cheered when the military stepped in and overthrew him, like so many turkeys voting for Christmas.

Morsi and his party behaved badly, the secular pro-democracy activists were no wiser, and they have both paid a high price in blood and misery for their mistakes. So is there any particular reason to highlight the fact and manner of Morsi’s passing?

Yes, because it creates an opportunity to consider what might have happened if he had not been overthrown.

He would probably still be alive, because he would have been getting good medical care, but he would no longer be in power. His four-year presidential term would have expired in 2016, and he would not have won a second term.

Whoever won the first election after long-ruling dictator Hosni Mubarak was overthrown in 2011 was winning a poisoned chalice, for the Egyptian economy was already on the rocks when the protests began. In fact, that’s why they started, and the long period of protesting and politicking that followed meant that nobody even started thinking about the economy again until early 2013.

The whole of Morsi’s first presidential term, had he served it out, would have been spent struggling to pull the economy out of the ditch. In the course of that, he would have had to impose all sorts of austerity measures that would have hurt exactly the people who were his core voters: the pious poor. And half of them wouldn’t have voted for him next time.

The whole tragedy of 2013, which ended up with General al-Sisi’s snipers killing more than a thousand unarmed protesters in Rabaa and Nahda Squares in Cairo and wounding at least 4,000 others – a massacre perhaps as bad as Tienanmen Square – was completely unnecessary. People more experienced with democracy would have known that Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood rule would both be rejected in the 2016 elections.

All they had to do was wait it out, and let the voters sort it out next time. That’s what Americans who deplore Donald Trump are doing right now, but they have more than two centuries of democratic government under their belt.

The voters may choose to make the same ‘mistake’ again, of course, being only human, but mostly they don’t. And even if they do, there will be another chance to fix things the next time around. As long as the decisions are not completely irrevocable, they can eventually be reversed – and you get to keep your democracy.

If Morsi had not been overthrown, the biggest Arab country, with one-third of the world’s Arabic-speaking people, would still be a democracy. Other Arab countries like Algeria and Sudan, where they are trying to make democracy happen today, would have a powerful supporter in Egypt, not a sworn enemy.

Syria would probably still have suffered a civil war, and so might Yemen, but the ultra-conservative monarchies of the Gulf would no longer dominate the Arab world with their money. Nobody can question the courage of the young men and women who overthrew the Egyptian dictatorship in 2011, but they were too ready to dispense with democracy at the first sign of trouble.
_________________________________
To shorten to 700 words, omit paragraphs 3 and 9. (“Morsi…2013″; and “Whoever…2013″)

Gwynne Dyer’s new book is ‘Growing Pains: The Future of Democracy (and Work)’.

Egypt’s Man of Destiny – For a While

To the vast surprise of absolutely nobody, Field Marshal Abdel Fatah al-Sisi won the Egyptian presidential election last week. Moreover, he won it with a majority that would pass for a resounding triumph in most countries. But it is a disarmingly modest majority for an Arab Man of Destiny.

Not for Sisi the implausible margins of victory claimed by Men of Destiny in other Arab countries, like the 96.3 percent that Egypt’s last dictator, Hosni Mubarak, claimed in his first election 21 years ago, or the spectacular 100 percent that Iraq’s Saddam Hussein allegedly got in his last election in 2002. No, Sisi just claimed 93.3 percent of the votes, a number low enough that it might actually be true.

Sisi’s real problem is that even with the media cowed and the full resources of the state behind him, only 46 percent of eligible Egyptians turned out to vote. He had confidently predicted an 80 percent turnout.

As an aspiring dictator who overthrew the country’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, only one year ago, Sisi needed a big turnout. At least 1,500 protesters have been shot dead in the streets, and a minimum of 16,000 political dissidents are in jail. Sisi has shut down a popular revolution and he needed to demonstrate massive public support for what he did.

He didn’t get it. Towards the end of the scheduled two days of the election, the people around him panicked. The interim prime minister, Ibrahim Mahlab, let slip that barely 30 percent had voted so far – and the regime abruptly announced that there would be a third day of voting. An unscheduled public holiday was declared, and non-voters were threatened with a large fine.

In the end, Sisi’s officials claimed a 46 percent turnout, although journalists reported that many polling booths were almost empty on the third day. But let’s be generous and assume that 40 percent of eligible Egyptians did vote.

If 93.3 percent of those people truly did vote for Sisi, then he has the support of just over one-third of Egyptians. Other Arab dictators have ruled their countries for decades with no more popular support than that, but it will probably not sustain Sisi through the hard times that are coming. Too many Egyptians are struggling just to feed their families.

Egypt’s economy is running on fumes, and there would not even be enough bread for people to eat – Egypt is the world’s largest importer of wheat – if Sisi were not getting massive infusions of aid from Saudi Arabia and most of the smaller Gulf states, which are very happy that he is killing off the Egyptian revolution.

But even the great wealth of the Gulf kingdoms cannot win Sisi more than a breathing space: all of them together have only about a third of Egypt’s population. And there is no good reason to believe that the Egyptian army, which is now effectively in charge, has the skill to resolve the country’s grave economic problems. Indeed, its highest priority will be to protect its own massive business empire.

Sisi talks about how Egyptians “must work, day and night, without rest” to restore the economy after three years of revolutionary chaos, and his budget plan calls for slashing energy subsidies by 22 percent in one year. Austerity is not going to win him any thanks from Egypt’s poor, however, and his political honeymoon will not last long.

What will happen after that can be predicted from the results of Egypt’s only fully free election two years ago. Mohamed Morsi and another Islamist candidate got a total of 42 percent of the votes in the first round of that election, while the leftist candidate, Hamdeen Sabahi, got 21 percent. (Morsi won in the second round, when Sabahi and two other candidates had dropped out.)

We can safely presume that few Islamist supporters voted at all in last week’s election. It’s clear that most of Sabahi’s former supporters also abstained: he was the only candidate who dared to run against Sisi, but he only got 3 percent this time. Islamists and leftists therefore make up the majority of the 55-60 percent who did not vote for Sisi this time – and that is good news for him, because the two groups have very little in common.

Those who did vote for Sisi were mostly people with no strong ideological convictions who were simply exhausted by the turmoil of the past three years. They voted for “stability”, and believed Sisi’s promise that he could deliver it. So long as they go on believing that, a deeply divided opposition poses little threat to him.

But most of the people who voted for Sisi thought that when he said “stability”, he really meant an improvement in their living standards, and it’s most unlikely that he can deliver that. When they lose faith in Sisi, the opposition will achieve critical mass, and it probably won’t take more than two years. The Egyptian revolution is not over yet.
__________________________
To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 8 and 9. (“Egypt’s…empire”)