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Morsi: A Death Foretold

Egypt’s first and last democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, died on Monday, lying on the floor of the courtroom where they were trying him on yet more charges. (He was already serving several life sentences.) It was probably a heart attack, but according to witnesses they left him lying there for twenty minutes before medical help arrived.

He was only 67, but he was not in good health: he had both diabetes and liver disease. But he was not getting proper treatment for those illnesses: a British parliamentary group that investigated his situation at his family’s request last year concluded that without urgent medical assistance the damage to his health could be “permanent and possibly terminal.” Well, it was.

Morsi was held in solitary confinement for six years, and saw his family just three times. His living conditions were such that the United Nations Human rights office has called for a “prompt, impartial, thorough and transparent investigation” into his death. Fair enough, but he is only one of thousands of Egyptians who have been murdered or tortured by the military regime that overthrew him in 2013.

Morsi was not a very good president: he was a narrow, stubborn man who governed solely in the interests of his own Muslim Brotherhood party and its Islamic priorities. He behaved like this even though he had barely scraped into the presidency with the votes of many who, though secular in their views and values, feared that otherwise the candidate of the old regime would win.

They fully shared his desire to uproot the secular ‘deep state’ that had ruled Egypt through three military dictators and six decades, but they had not signed up for an Islamist constitution instead. So they started demonstrating against Morsi, and only a year after he was elected they cheered when the military stepped in and overthrew him, like so many turkeys voting for Christmas.

Morsi and his party behaved badly, the secular pro-democracy activists were no wiser, and they have both paid a high price in blood and misery for their mistakes. So is there any particular reason to highlight the fact and manner of Morsi’s passing?

Yes, because it creates an opportunity to consider what might have happened if he had not been overthrown.

He would probably still be alive, because he would have been getting good medical care, but he would no longer be in power. His four-year presidential term would have expired in 2016, and he would not have won a second term.

Whoever won the first election after long-ruling dictator Hosni Mubarak was overthrown in 2011 was winning a poisoned chalice, for the Egyptian economy was already on the rocks when the protests began. In fact, that’s why they started, and the long period of protesting and politicking that followed meant that nobody even started thinking about the economy again until early 2013.

The whole of Morsi’s first presidential term, had he served it out, would have been spent struggling to pull the economy out of the ditch. In the course of that, he would have had to impose all sorts of austerity measures that would have hurt exactly the people who were his core voters: the pious poor. And half of them wouldn’t have voted for him next time.

The whole tragedy of 2013, which ended up with General al-Sisi’s snipers killing more than a thousand unarmed protesters in Rabaa and Nahda Squares in Cairo and wounding at least 4,000 others – a massacre perhaps as bad as Tienanmen Square – was completely unnecessary. People more experienced with democracy would have known that Morsi and Muslim Brotherhood rule would both be rejected in the 2016 elections.

All they had to do was wait it out, and let the voters sort it out next time. That’s what Americans who deplore Donald Trump are doing right now, but they have more than two centuries of democratic government under their belt.

The voters may choose to make the same ‘mistake’ again, of course, being only human, but mostly they don’t. And even if they do, there will be another chance to fix things the next time around. As long as the decisions are not completely irrevocable, they can eventually be reversed – and you get to keep your democracy.

If Morsi had not been overthrown, the biggest Arab country, with one-third of the world’s Arabic-speaking people, would still be a democracy. Other Arab countries like Algeria and Sudan, where they are trying to make democracy happen today, would have a powerful supporter in Egypt, not a sworn enemy.

Syria would probably still have suffered a civil war, and so might Yemen, but the ultra-conservative monarchies of the Gulf would no longer dominate the Arab world with their money. Nobody can question the courage of the young men and women who overthrew the Egyptian dictatorship in 2011, but they were too ready to dispense with democracy at the first sign of trouble.
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To shorten to 700 words, omit paragraphs 3 and 9. (“Morsi…2013″; and “Whoever…2013″)

Gwynne Dyer’s new book is ‘Growing Pains: The Future of Democracy (and Work)’.

Egypt: Sisi, Morsi and Democracy

Mohammed Morsi, Egypt’s first democratically elected president, has now been in prison more than three times as long as he was in the presidential palace, but his death sentence was quashed last week. On Tuesday the country’s highest appeal court also overturned his life sentence on a separate charge – but that doesn’t mean he’s going to be free any time soon.

The appeal court not only cancelled Morsi’s death and life sentences, but also those of sixteen other senior members of his party, the Muslim Brotherhood. “The verdict was full of legal flaws,” said Morsi’s lawyer, Abdel Moneim Abdel Maksoud. The men will all stay in jail indefinitely, as the military regime can easily get convictions on other charges in the lower courts, but justice is not entirely dead in Egypt.

Democracy IS dead, however. Since General Abdel Fatah al-Sisi’s coup destroyed Morsi’s elected government in July 2013, at least 1,400 Egyptians have been murdered by the regime. (That includes the thousand people who were killed in the streets in August 2013 while non-violently protesting against the coup – a massacre at least as bloody as the Tienanmen Square slaughter in Beijing in 1989.)

The army was never going to accept the non-violent revolution that overthrew former general Hosni Mubarak’s 29-year-old regime in January of 2011: its officers benefit greatly from its control over at least a quarter of the Egyptian economy. But the military had the wit to bide their time, whereas the young revolutionaries were neither experienced nor united, and they quickly began making mistakes.

Their worst was to fail to unite behind a single candidate in defence of a secular democracy. Instead, the presidential election of July 2012 ended up in a run-off between Air Chief Marshal Ahmed Shafik, Mubarak’s last prime minister, and Mohammed Morsi, the representative of the Muslim Brotherhood. Enough secular voters held their noses and backed Morsi to give him a narrow victory in the second round.

The Muslim Brotherhood was a moderate Islamic party that had been tolerated under the Mubarak regime. Its main supporters were conservative rural voters and the pious poor, and it felt obliged to reward them by inserting more Islamic elements into the new constitution. Besides, Islamists really believe that making the country more “Islamic” will solve its problems. That’s why they are Islamists.

It was far from wholesale Islamisation, but it was enough to panic the urban and mostly secular young people who had led the revolution. In a stupid attempt to force the new constitution through, Morsi granted himself total executive power and began ruling by decree in November 2012. After ten days he realised he had made a dreadful mistake and relinquished his special powers, but it was too late.

In an equally foolish reaction, the young revolutionaries concluded that Morsi was a dictator in the making and began agitating for an early election to get rid of him. They simply didn’t understand that the democratic solution was to wait the full four years and then vote Morsi out. By then, given the state of Egypt’s economy, he would be so unpopular that he would be certain to lose.

Some even thought that the army was their friend and would help them to get rid of Morsi. So the anti-Morsi demonstrations grew through the first half of 2013, and on the first anniversary of his election on 30 June millions came out in the streets to demand that he quit. The army moved at last, and in days Sisi was in power and Morsi was in jail.

In due course, many thousands of the young revolutionary generation were also in jail: the latest estimate is 60,000 political prisoners. The Sisi regime is far more brutal and repressive than any of its military predecessors, but its plans to welcome foreign investment, privatise the infrastructure and restrict the right to strike have lots of foreign support.

Last year the regime held a national coming-out party at the Sharm al-Shaikh resort: the Egyptian Economic Development Conference. It invited 1,700 investors, consultants and foreign government officials including the US secretary of state, the British foreign minister, and the head of the International Monetary Fund. They were pleased by what they heard..

Former British prime minister Tony Blair was also there. “Look,” he burbled, “I’m absolutely in favour of democracy, but I also think you’ve got to be realistic sometimes about the path of development, and that sometimes you will have a country with not what we would call 100 percent Western-style democracy, but it is going in a direction of development that is really important.”

Far away from the conference hall, however, tens of thousands of innocent people rotted in jail, and real terrorists affiliated with Islamic State and al-Qaeda ruled over northern Sinai and regularly set off bombs in Cairo.
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To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraph 12. (“Former…important”)

Egypt: Triumph and Tragedy

Exactly five years after Egypt’s democratic revolution triumphed, the country is once more ruled by a military office. General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi seized power in July 2013 and is even nastier than his predecessors.

More than 600 Egyptians were sentenced to death last year, mostly in mass trials, and most of the cases involved people who had gone to pro-democracy protests.

When Hosni Mubarak was forced to resign from the Egyptian presidency on Feb. 9, 2011, by nationwide non-violent demonstrations, there was an explosion of joy. It ended an unbroken 59 years when thinly disguised military dictators ruled the country and their cronies looted the economy.

Egypt’s democratic revolution followed closely in the footsteps of the Tunisian revolution that triggered the “Arab Spring,” but it mattered far more because the country’s 90 million people account for almost a third of the world’s Arabs. Despite the disaster in Syria, we would still count the Arab Spring as a success if the Egyptian revolution had survived, but it was never going to be easy.

The protesters who drove the revolution in the cities were mostly young, well-educated and secular, but most Egyptians are rural, poorly educated and devout. Moreover, the Muslim Brotherhood had for decades been providing free social services to poor Egyptians. They were grateful and they were pious, so of course they voted for the Islamists.

The young revolutionaries should have understood that the Muslim Brotherhood was bound to win Egypt’s first free election. Most of them were horrified when “their” revolution actually ended up making the Muslim Brotherhood’s candidate, Mohamed Morsi, the country’s first democratically elected president.

Morsi had his own problems, including trying to balance his own party’s expectation of rapid Islamization with the reality that the army and much of the urban population were committed to a secular Egypt. He was not good at tightrope walking, so what he probably saw as reasonable compromises were viewed by his opponents as forcing political Islam down people’s throats.

If his opponents had also more political experience, they would have calculated the Muslim Brotherhood was bound to lose the next election. The Egyptian economy was a disaster, so in four years’ time they would be deeply unpopular.

Instead, in June 2013, just one year after Morsi became president, they launched mass demonstrations demanding a new election – and called on the army to support their cause. El-Sisi, whom Morsi had trustingly appointed as defense minister, led a military coup that deposed the Muslim Brotherhood leader.

El-Sisi took off his uniform and had himself elected president. The army is back in power, and the number of secular political activists in jail is now probably greater than the number of Muslim Brotherhood supporters.

“The level of repression now is significantly higher than it was under the Mubarak regime,” Egyptian investigative journalist Hossam Bahgat told The Guardian last month. “People from older generations say it is worse than even the worst periods of the 1950s and 60s.”

It is too soon to conclude that a modern democracy cannot thrive in the Arab world? Tunisia, after all, is still managing to hang on to its revolution, and the sheer number of people that Sisi has jailed suggests that his regime is far from secure. But nobody in Egypt is celebrating the fifth anniversary of the country’s democratic revolution.

Egypt Referendum

11 January 2014

Egypt Referendum

By Gwynne Dyer

General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, who led the coup against Egypt’s elected president last July, has one of the finest collections of military headgear in the entire Middle East. Perhaps that’s why he has still not admitted that he plans to become the next president: he can’t decide which hat to throw into the ring.

His own explanation for his shyness comes straight out of the Aspiring Dictator’s Handbook: “If I nominate myself, there must be a popular demand, and a mandate from my army,” he told the state-owned paper Al-Ahram.“When Egyptians say something, we obey, and I will never turn my back on Egypt.”

Egyptian generals are deeply patriotic people, and three others before Sisi have sacrificed their own desire for a quiet life in order to rule Egypt: Gamal Abdel Nasser (1956-70), Anwar Sadat (1970-81) and Hosni Mubarak (1981-2011). In fact, the last three years have been the only time in the life of the great majority of Egyptians when a general has not been running the country, and Sisi seems ready to make the supreme sacrifice too.

A mandate from the army shouldn’t be hard to get, since he runs the whole organisation. And as far as “popular demand” is concerned, Sisi is clearly planning to use a “yes” vote in this week’s referendum on the new constitution as proof that the people want him for president.

The new constitution will be the third in four years. It replaces the one that was written and adopted (also by referendum) during the brief, unhappy rule of President Mohamed Morsi, who took office on 30 June 2012 and was overthrown on 3 July 2013. It removes the “Islamic” changes that Morsi’s Muslim Brotherhood wrote into the last one, which should appeal to secular Egyptians, but that’s not what makes it attractive to General Sisi.

The new clauses that only a soldier could love include one that gives the Egyptian military the right to appoint the defence minister, and another that says the military budget will not be subject to civilian oversight. It also retains the much-criticised clause that allows civilians to be tried in military courts. Sisi reckons enough civilians will vote for it anyway, some because they hate the Islamists and some because they are just tired of all the upheavals.

Maybe they will, because the whole Arab world is suffering from revolution fatigue: the “Arab awakening” has caused such turbulence that many people would find a return to the old dictatorships almost comforting. It’s true even in Syria, where some of the rebels are starting to talk about making a deal with the Assad regime in order to isolate the Islamist extremists and hasten the end of the war.

There has been no war in Egypt, but about a thousand of Morsi’s supporters were massacred in the streets of Cairo by the “security forces” last summer, and the Muslim Brotherhood has been declared a terrorist organisation. There have been many thousands of arrests, not only of senior Muslim Brotherhood members but recently of secular critics of the of the military regime as well.

Egyptians are frightened and exhausted, and Sisi apparently thinks they will gratefully accept a return to army rule (behind a democratic facade). But his nervousness is showing: there’s barely a wall in Cairo that is not covered with “Yes” posters and pictures of Sisi, while people trying to put up “No” posters get arrested. Sisi is probably right to be nervous.

In late September, three months after the coup, Zogby Research Services carried out an extensive opinion poll in Egypt for the Sir Bani Yas Forum in Abu Dhabi. It revealed that confidence in the army had already dropped from 93 percent to 70 percent, and it probably has gone on dropping.

General Sisi and former President Morsi had almost equal support in the country – 46 percent for Sisi, 44 percent for Morsi (who now faces trial for “inciting his supporters to carry out premeditated murder” and various other alleged crimes).

But Morsi’s trial was postponed last week from 8 January to 1 February, allegedly because bad weather prevented him from being flown from his prison in Alexandria to Cairo for the trial. That’s a rather long spell of bad weather, and besides it’s only two and a half hours by road from Alexandria to Cairo. One suspects that the military regime did not want Morsi to make his first public appearance since the coup just before the referendum.

The Zogby poll also revealed that an overwhelming majority of respondents blame the last military regime, under Hosni Mubarak, for the problems facing Egypt today. All in all, this is hardly a firm foundation on which to complete the counter-revolution and build a new military regime.

The likeliest outcome of the referendum on the new constitution this week (Tuesday and Wednesday) will be a modest majority for the “Yes”, but on a very low turnout. If it is lower than the mere 33 percent who voted in the referendum on the last constitution in 2012, then Sisi may have to reconsider his plan to run for the presidency.

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To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 8 and 12. (“There…well”; and “But Morsi’s…referendum”)

Gwynne Dyer is an independent journalist whose articles are published in 45 countries.