// archives

Venezuela

This tag is associated with 22 posts

Venezuela: Guaidó’s Patience Runs Out

Back in early March, it seemed that both sides in Venezuela had decided a long drawn out crisis was better than a civil war. It appears that the leader of one side has now changed his mind.

Almost four months ago Juan Guaidó challenged President Nicolás Maduro on the grounds that his re-election last year had been fraudulent. Guaidó claimed to be the legitimate president himself, and Maduro did not arrest him, presumably because he feared that it would cause a civil war that he might lose. Since Guaidó wasn’t sure he would win it either, he also held his fire.

The political operation to remove Maduro was clearly coordinated with Washington. Guaidó was doubtless told that if he declared himself president, the United States and fifty of its friends and allies would recognise him – which they promptly did. But he still avoided a showdown with Maduro, and restricted himself to making speeches (which Maduro did not interfere with).

Both men knew they were on shaky ground legally. Maduro won a rigged election, but Guaidó didn’t even run in it.

As president of the National Assembly, Guaidó is in the line of succession if the president dies or goes crazy, but whether or not he has the right to replace a sitting president just because he believes the president cheated in the election is the sort of question that makes lawyers rich. Most non-lawyers would say he doesn’t have that right.

That’s beside the point. This is a power struggle, in which Maduro still controls the army, but Guaidó has powerful foreigners and a large but unknown portion of the Venezuelan population on his side. Both men decided to play a waiting game, in the hope that the tide would turn in their direction. It was the right choice.

However, for reasons best known to himself, Guaidó has now changed his mind. maybe he thinks the tide is now running in his direction, or maybe he fears that Maduro will win by default if he doesn’t act now, but he has clearly decided that the showdown should happen now.

On Monday he released a three-minute video showing him together with men in Venezuelan military uniforms and claiming that the armed forces have come over to his side. “The moment is now,” he says.

Some of the ordinary soldiers may be on his side, but there is little evidence for it except Guaidó’s video. The officers, and especially the generals, are not ready to change sides, partly because they are dedicated Chavistas, but also because few of the generals have managed to hide their loot somewhere safe abroad. They only get to keep it if Maduro stays in power.

By going on to a military base and trying to turn the military against the government Guaidó has committed high treason, and Maduro has to respond. Yet it is not at all certain that Guaidó’s supporters, numerous though they may be, will win the battle in the streets.

He summoned them to come out on the streets of Caracas on Tuesday, and called on the army to support them. They did come, but so did Maduro’s supporters (or more precisely, people who still support Hugo Chávez’s original revolution, though not many of them have the same deep affection for Maduro). Over a hundred people were injured during the day.

And yes, some dozens of National Guardsmen did switch sides on Tuesday, but thousands did not. More importantly, the regular army has remained loyal to Maduro. Guaidó called his supporters out again on Wednesday, but at the time of writing (Wednesday morning), there is no sign that Maduro is about to flee the country, or that his army is going to defect.

It’s too early to be sure, but it looks like Guaidó moved too soon. He will probably soon be in jail if he does not flee the country. His political mentor and party leader, Leopoldo López, has already sought refuge with his family in the Spanish embassy. And Maduro has already claimed on television that he has defeated the “attempted military coup.”

What persuaded Guaidó to abandon the slow and cautious strategy he has pursued for the past four months and go for broke instead? The suspicion must be that he did it under pressure from Washington, where President Trump is impatient, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo is compliant, and nobody understands Venezuela very well.

Nobody except the US armed forces, which have made it quietly clear from the start that they do not want to end up giving military support to Venezuelan rebels. But nobody in Trump’s Washington listens to the army.

To shorten to 700 words, omit paragraph 9. (“Some…power”)

Venezuela: Taking It Slow

Juan Guaidó returned to Venezuela on Monday after almost two weeks doing the rounds of Latin American capitals that recognise his claim to be the ‘interim president’ of the country. He defied a government ban in order to leave the country, so he should be arrested any minute now. Or maybe not.

Despite all the ferocious rhetoric from both Guaidó’s camp and Nicolás Maduro’s ‘elected’ regime, there is a curious lack of urgency in their actions.

Maduro has still not arrested Guaidó, although in the past he imprisoned other opposition leaders for much lesser offences than claiming to be president. And Guaidó has not yet appointed an ‘interim vice-president’ to take over if he goes to jail– which suggests that he doesn’t really expect to be arrested either.

Given the fragmented nature of the Venezuelan opposition – four major parties that have a fragile power-sharing agreement called the Democratic Unity Roundtable (MUD) – Guaidó’s reluctance to pick a vice-president from one of them is understandable. He only became president of the National Assembly last year because it was the ‘turn’ of his party, Popular Will.

He can’t choose his potential replacement from Popular Will too, but there is no agreement in place for which other opposition party should provide that leader instead. So to avoid a struggle within the MUD coalition in the midst of his confrontation with the Maduro regime, Guaidó simply hasn’t chosen an interim vice-president.

On the other hand, if Guaidó were arrested now without having appointed a deputy, there would be an equally great risk of a squabble breaking out between the four parties in MUD over who should succeed him. Conclusion: he calculates that he probably won’t be arrested. Of course, he could be wrong, but so far this is a very slow-moving crisis.

The lack of urgency even extends to the US armed forces, which are making no visible preparations to invade Venezuela. Connoisseurs of America’s foreign wars know that they almost always clank around for several weeks or months moving forces into place before they actually cross a defended border. They are not doing that.

Why is everybody moving so slowly? Because they are all still hoping that there can be a peaceful outcome, if nobody pushes too hard right now.

Guaidó’s big disappointment came on Saturday, when he had promised that hundreds of thousands of people would go the borders to bring in the US-supplied ‘humanitarian aid’ that the Maduro regime has been blocking. It didn’t go very well. The masses didn’t show up, and the Venezuelan soldiers who are keeping the aid out didn’t defect in significant numbers.

But Maduro can’t be very confident either. He knows that the desperate shortages of food and medicine (which have caused three million Venezuelans to leave the country in the past few years) have severely eroded the regime’s popular support.

Maduro got only one-third of the seats in the 2015 elections to the National Assembly, and responded by trying to replace it with a rival ‘Constituent Assembly’. (The National Assembly is still in business, however, and Guaidó is its president). He had to rig the voting and imprison opposition leaders to ‘win’ last year’s presidential election. The best estimate is that he retains about 15% popular support.

And the US army really doesn’t want to invade Venezuela. It’s looking forward to being released from seventeen years of unwinnable guerilla wars in the Middle East, and the last thing it needs now is a new counter-insurgency campaign in Venezuela.

That’s probably what it would face if it invaded. Maduro’s regime has certainly lost majority support, but even if only fifteen percent of the population remain loyal to the ‘revolution’, there would still be a guerilla and terrorist resistance that might last for years.

The Maduro regime is slowly unravelling, mainly because of its spectacular incompetence. Every major oil-exporting economy has been hurt by the drop in oil prices, but only in Venezuela are large numbers of people facing severe malnutrition, and only in Venezuela has oil production fallen – by an astonishing two-thirds.

It’s not because of US sanctions, which only began in a serious way in 2017, and it’s not because of ‘socialism’. (Cuba came through a cash-flow crisis just as profound after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and nobody starved.) It’s because words like ‘re-investment’ and ‘maintenance’ are not part of the Chavista vocabulary.

If the regime is probably heading for collapse anyway, it’s in nobody’s interest to unleash major and long-lasting violence by pushing too hard now. Amnesties and other deals could ease a peaceful transition, and there’s still time to see if that would work.

That doesn’t mean that this confrontation can’t have a violent conclusion, but it does explain why all the major players are taking it slow.

To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs . (“On…crisis”)

Gwynne Dyer’s new book is ‘Growing Pains: The Future of Democracy (and Work)’.

Trump: the Reagan Gambit?

Last Sunday I wrote a piece on the political crisis in Venezuela. Then on Wednesday I wrote an article on Donald Trump’s hyperbolic language about North Korea. But it never occurred to me that the next article would be about Trump, North Korea AND Venezuela. I forgot about the Reagan Gambit.

In October, 1983, US President Ronald Reagan had a little problem. A massive truck-bomb had killed 241 American Marines in their barracks at Beirut airport. That was more than a quarter of the total American force deployed as “peacekeepers” to Lebanon – a deployment that had already become controversial in the United States. So Reagan had some explaining to do.

In another part of the world entirely, the tiny Caribbean island nation of Grenada, pop. 90,000, had another military coup – a coup within the coup. A radical pro-Cuban politician called Maurice Bishop,who had overthrown the elected government, was executed by his fellow revolutionaries over some minor differences of opinion. A pity, perhaps, but of no more importance to the rest of the world than Grenada itself.

The Cold War was running quite hot in this period, so although the island had no strategic value the American right was getting upset about Russians and Cubans building an airport on Grenada. In the normal course of events this would probably not have led to an American invasion, but Reagan badly needed a political distraction.

On 25 October, precisely two days after the bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, the US military began a full-scale invasion of Grenada on Reagan’s orders. It was one of history’s most one-sided battles – only 19 Americans killed, although the US handed out 5,000 medals for merit and valour – but it did the trick.

A friend said to me at the time that Reagan had gone home and kicked the cat, which was true enough, but conquering Grenada didn’t just make him feel better. There’s only room for one lead story at a time, and Grenada pushed Beirut aside in the US media. When Reagan quietly pulled the remaining Marines out of Lebanon four months later, few people even remembered to ask what those other Marines had died for.

And now Donald Trump, stumbling deeper each day into an confrontation with North Korea over nuclear-armed ICBMs he swore that Pyongyang would never get, may be looking for a way out. So on Sunday, he said: “We have many options for Venezuela – and by the way, I am not going to rule out a military option.”

He said it although nobody had asked him if he was planning to invade Venezuela. (It hadn’t occurred to anybody that he might.) And he said it from his golf course in New Jersey. (Reagan made his Grenada decision on a golf course too). And it certainly did take North Korea out of the news for at least one or two cycles.

He then offered a classic Trumpian non-justification for threatening to use military force in Venezuela: “This is our neighbor. You know, we are all over the world and we have troops all over the world in places that are very, very far away. Venezuela is not very far away and the people are suffering, and they are dying. We have many options for Venezuela, including a possible military option if necessary.”

So be on your best behaviour, all you other governments in Latin America and Canada, or he might come for you too. But is he actually planning to invade Venezuela, a fairly well-armed country of 30 million people?

Trump has already given President Nicolas Maduro’s beleaguered regime a propaganda gift by strengthening its argument that its opponents are all traitors and American spies. Does he realise that an American invasion of Venezuela would trigger both a bloody civil war and a prolonged anti-American resistance movement?

Probably not. He knows that Venezuela is a superpower in the “Miss Universe” universe, but he will not have read the full briefing paper unless they remembered to put his name in every paragraph (and he may have caught onto that trick by now).

It would be nice if this threat about Venezuela were evidence that Trump knows he is in over his head with North Korea and is looking for a face-saving way out, but it’s not likely to be true. It’s much more likely to be just another example to his scattershot approach to dealing with a problem: create as many other problems as possible, and the pressure will come off.

Ronald Reagan knew he had walked into a hornet’s nest in Lebanon, and just needed
to create a diversion while he found a way of getting American troops out of the Middle East. It’s not clear that Trump even understands that he is in deep trouble, and that he is at risk of starting a nuclear war in order to prevent one.

Stream-of-consciousness decision-making is unfailingly interesting, if you are using “interesting” in the sense of the faux-Chinese curse: “May you live in interesting times.” But in real life, that’s the last place you want to live.
___________________________________
To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 9 and 10. (“He then…people”)

Venezuela: Civil War?

There are two stories about the assault on Fuerte Paramacay military barracks in Carabobo state on Sunday. The Venezuelan government says that half the twenty attackers were killed or captured, and the rest are being hunted down. Sgt. Giomar Flores, who defected from the Venezuelan navy in June and now lives in Colombia, told The Guardian that the attack had been “a complete success.”

“We took four battalions and one put up resistance,” he said, claiming to be in direct contact with the leader of the attack, Capt. Juan Caguaripano. The rebels took “a large amount of weapons,” mostly assault rifles, and got away with no casualties.

Whichever story you believe, witnesses agree that large numbers of civilians living near the base in Valencia, the capital of Carabobo, spilled out onto the streets in support of the rebels. Civil war in Venezuela is not yet a reality, but there is ample dry tinder lying around just waiting for a match.

The attack came just one week after the election of a “constituent assembly” by the supporters of President Nicolas Maduro’s beleaguered government. It’s hardly surprising that the opposition boycotted the vote, because the purpose of the new assembly is to rewrite the constitution and save Maduro from defeat at the next election.

That’s not Maduro’s explanation for it, of course. He says it is the only way to bring “reconciliation and peace” to the country after months of political and economic crisis, but everybody outside his Socialist Party sees it as a constitutional coup.

The constituent assembly, which Maduro created by decree, consists exclusively of 545 Maduro supporters. There is no time limit on how long it will sit, nor any restrictions on what it can do. It can, for example, postpone the presidential elections that are due next year indefinitely. This matters a lot, since Maduro would certainly lose in a fair vote – recent estimates put his popular support at around 20 percent.

More immediately, it can dissolve the legitimate National Assembly, in which the opposition parties won a two-thirds majority in the December, 2015 election. And it has already fired Prosecutor-General Luisa Ortega, a member of the Socialist Party and former ally of Maduro’s who broke with him over his increasingly arbitrary behaviour.

The most threatening thing Ortega did was to open an investigation last week into the vote on 30 July that created the constituent assembly. Since only Maduro’s supporters voted, that would seem irrelevant – but in mid-July the opposition had held an informal referendum in which seven million people voted against the constituent assembly.

Maduro therefore felt the need to claim that more than eight million Venezuelans had voted for the new assembly. Even that would not really be a very impressive turnout in a country of 30 million people – but then the company that supplied the voting machines, SmartMatic, said that the result had been deliberately inflated. At least a million extra votes had been added.

Antonio Mugica, the chief executive of SmartMatic, said that all previous elections in Venezuela using their machines had been conducted fairly. “It is, therefore, with the deepest regret that we have to report that the turnout figures on 30 July for the Constituent Assembly in Venezuela were tampered with,” he said.

It may have been worse than that. Internal figures from the National Electoral Council (probably shown to Reuters by Luis Rondón, the only one of the five NEC directors who is not a government loyalist), show that only 3.7 million people had voted by 5.30 pm – and the polls closed at 7 pm. Ortega appointed two prosecutors to investigate the other four directors of the NEC, but she is gone now and the investigation will not continue.

“This is a dictatorship,” Luisa Ortega said on Sunday, and she is right. Maduro has concluded that he and his Socialist Party can only stay in power by suppressing all opposition, and he is probably right. The regime he inherited in 2013 on the death of its founder, Hugo Chavez, was once genuinely popular and won free elections, but four years of falling oil prices, economic mismanagement and growing corruption have put an end to that.

The street protests against Maduro have lasted four months now, and at least 120 people have been killed. Inflation is 1,600 percent, food and medicines are scarce, and the murder rate is among the highest in the world. The generals are richly rewarded for serving the regime, but rank-and-file soldiers earn a couple of dozen dollars a month.

Venezuela is a tinderbox. There are hundreds of thousands of devoted supporters of the “Chavista” regime, and the government has distributed weapons to them. If the report that most soldiers did not resist the attack on the Valencia barracks is true, the army may be about to split. The violence in the streets is mutating, with more police casualties as well as the daily toll of demonstrators.

There is no worse disaster for a country than a civil war, but Venezuela is drifting towards one.
_________________________________
To shorten to 725 words, omit paragraphs 5 and 11. (“That’s…coup”; and “It may…continue”)